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SYMPOSIUM





As a threshold matter, what types of things are patentable? What
types of things are not? Section 101 of the Patent Act lists four big
categories: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title."' The operative language has
scarcely changed since it was first enacted in 1793.
Most patent claims to products fit squarely within one of the three
product-style categories and thus cause no analytical difficulties. From
fluoxetine hydrochloride, the active ingredient in Prozac (U.S. Patent
No. 4,314,081), to bubble wrap (U.S. Patent No. 3,142,599), to the air-
. Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. 2010 0 Joseph Scott Miller. Upon publi-
cation of this work in the Lewis & Clark Law Review, I license my copyright in this
work to all under the Creative Commons license known as Attribution 3.0 Unported.
You can see a summary of this license at http://creativecommons.org/licenses
/by/3.0/. Attribution should be to me as the author and to Lewis & Clark Law Review
as the first publisher. Upon my death, my copyright in this work is dedicated to the
public domain.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (providing patent protection
for one who "allege(s] that he ... ha[s] invented any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the
application"). The terminological change from "art" to "process" is superficial, not
substantive. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) ("Although the term
'process' was not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952, a process has historically en-
joyed patent protection because it was considered a form of 'art' as that term was
used in the 1793 Act.").
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plane (U.S. Patent No. 821,393), practical solutions to concrete problems
fall comfortably within the scope of § 101. The patent system had more
difficulty analyzing the patentability of genetically modified organisms,
but the Supreme Court resolved the issue 30 years ago, in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, when it held that they are "manufactures" for Patent Act
3purposes.
The "process" category, by contrast, continues to vex the patent sys-
tem. Industrial processes-curing rubber, cracking oil, tanning leather,
grinding flour, turning wood-are not the problem. Computer-
implemented processes and, more generally, business methods continue
to raise tough questions at § 101's outer boundary. This is so because the
Supreme Court has long held that the categories in § 101, although
broad, have limits: "Excluded from such patent protection are laws of na-
ture, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."5 A process, claimed sepa-
rately from the device or materials used to practice it, is already more ab-
stract than a claim to a product. But is it too abstract? What criterion,
other than "abstractness" itself, can we use to decide whether a process
claim is fatally abstract? In 2010, the Supreme Court returned to the de-
bate in the business-methods case of Bilski v. Kappos, after a long hiatus
since its computer-process trilogy of Gottschalk v. Benson,7 Parker v. Flook,
and Diamond v. Diehr.9 This symposium issue of the Lewis & Clark Law Re-
view presents papers from the leading theorists on the scope of § 101's
"process" category.
My goal in this brief Essay is to introduce the symposium papers by
describing the basics of the Bilski case. I also offer a brief thought about
where interested observers might turn next in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit's § 101 jurisprudence for insights about how that
court may implement Bilski's unmistakable revival of Benson and Fook.
Specifically, now that the 15-year Alappat/State Street misadventure, with
' 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) ("[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the po-
tential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; ac-
cordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101."). Since 1987, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has taken the position that, although more
complex organisms than the engineered bacterium at issue in Chakrabarty-such as
transgenic cows, goats, and pigs-are appropriate patentable subject matter, the PTO
cannot issue a patent claim that covers a human being. See JANIcE M. MUELLER,
PATENT LAw 279-80 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing post-Chakrabarty developments).
' See generally Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182-84 & n.7 (discussing the longstanding paten-
tability of industrial processes).
' Id. at 185 (collecting cases).
6 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
7 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
8 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
9 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
2 [Vol. 15:1
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its patent-maximizing "useful, concrete, and tangible result" standard,'o
has come to an end, it is time to revisit the reasoning and results in a rich
trove of cases from the Federal Circuit and its predecessor, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA).
Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw, the named inventors of the appli-
cation at issue in the Bilski case, sought to patent a process for hedging
risk in commodities trading. The principal claim recites the hedging me-
thod as follows:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps
of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity pro-
vider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consum-
ers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon histor-
ical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of
said consumer;
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a
counter-risk position to said consumers; and
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity pro-
vider and said market participants at a second fixed rate such
that said series of market participant transactions balances the
risk position of said series of consumer transactions"
rn See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that "the transformation of data, representing discrete
dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a
final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result'-
a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even
accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades"); In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("This is not a disembodied
mathematical concept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a
specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."). Although Alap-
pat and State Street involved product, not process, claims, the Federal Circuit quickly
applied the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" standard to process claims. See
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Because
the claimed process applies the Boolean principle to produce a useful, concrete,
tangible result without pre-empting other uses of the mathematical principle, on its
face the claimed process comfortably falls within the scope of § 101.").
" In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008), affd, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
The interested reader can see the remainder of Bilski's claims in the PTO's recently
published interim guidelines for analyzing patentable-subject-matter questions. See
Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in
View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43922, at 43926-27 (proposed July 27, 2010)
(listing Bilski's claims).
2011] 3
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The front-line patent examiner rejected the claims as beyond the
scope of "process" in § 101." The PTO's Board of Patent Appeals & Inter-
ferences, comprising five administrative patent judges, affirmed. The en
banc Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed, 11 to 1; Judge Newman, alone,
thought the claims passed muster under § 101.14 The Supreme Court af-
firmed again, 9 to 0, in a set of three opinions.'" In other words, of the 21
federal judges to consider the question, 20 agreed that Bilski's claims fall
outside the scope of "process" in § 101. At the same time, those 20 have
disagreed mightily over the proper framework for explaining this result
and analyzing future cases.
The Federal Circuit majority began with the indisputable fact that
"the Supreme Court has held that the meaning of 'process' as used in
§ 101 is narrower than its ordinary meaning.... Specifically, the Court
has held that a claim is not a patent-eligible 'process' if it claims 'laws of
nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.'""6 The majority then
canvassed the Supreme Court's decisions in Diehr, Benson, and Fook to
distill from them a standard by which to determine whether the claimed
risk-hedging process at issue is or is not an unpatentable abstract idea.17 It
dubbed the standard "the machine-or-transformation test," describing it
as "the tool used to determine whether a claim is drawn to a statutory
'process"" and "the governing test for determining patent eligibility of a
process under § 101." 9 Under this test, "[a] claimed process is surely pa-
tent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or appa-
ratus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.",o This test has two important companion principles, also derived
from Benson and Fook: "First, . . . the use of a specific machine or trans-
formation of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's
scope to impart patent-eligibility. Second, the involvement of the ma-
chine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be in-
1 In re Bitski, 545 F.3d at 950.
Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
' Chief Judge Michel, writing for himself and eight others, concluded that the
claims constituted unpatentable subject matter. In re Bikski, 545 F.3d at 949. Judges
Mayer and Rader agreed with that outcome, although each dissented separately from
the majority's framework and reasoning. Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting); id. at 1011
(Rader,J., dissenting).Judge Newman disagreed on all counts. Id. at 976.
1 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
1 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)).
17 Id. at 952-58.
1 Id. at 956 n.11.
9 Id. at 956. See also id. at 964 (stating that "the machine-or-transformation test is
the only applicable test and must be applied ... when evaluating the patent-eligibility
of process claims").
" Id. at 954. See also id. at 961 (stating that "an applicant may show that a process
claim satisfies § 101 either by showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or
by showing that his claim transforms an article").
4 [Vol. 15:1
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significant extra-solution activity."a2 Bilski's claims flunked the machine-
or-transformation test. They neither "limit[ed] any process step to any
specific machine or apparatus"2 nor "transform[ed] any article to a dif-
ferent state or thing." Rearranging business relationships is insufficient:
"Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private
legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstrac-
tions cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or sub-
stances, and they are not representative of physical objects or sub-
stances."24
For the Federal Circuit majority, then, the machine-or-
transformation test was a critical step in operationalizing the Supreme
Court's longstanding injunction against permitting the patenting of ab-
stract ideas.
Judge Mayer, for his part, would have rejected Bilski's claims on the
alternative ground that business methods are simply not § 101
"process [es] ": "Affording patent protection to business methods lacks
constitutional and statutory support, serves to hinder rather than pro-
mote innovation and usurps that which rightfully belongs in the public
domain."2 5 Justice Stevens, on review, reached the same conclusion in his
concurrence for four of the Justices. Judge Rader, by contrast, rejected
both the majority's machine-or-transformation test and Judge Mayer's ca-
tegorical exclusion for business methods. Instead, he concluded, simply,
that the risk-hedging claims were fatally abstract and thus outside the
reach of § 101: "This court labors for page after page . . . to say what
could have been said in a single sentence: 'Because Bilski claims merely
an abstract idea, this court affirms the Board's rejection.' 2 Justice Ken-
nedy, on review, reached the same conclusion in his opinion for the ma-
jority of the Justices.2 It is to the Supreme Court's opinions in the case
that I now turn.
2 Id. at 961-62 (citation omitted).
22 Id. at 962.
23 Id. at 963.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer, frankly, ought to have labeled
his opinion a concurrence in the judgment, for he agrees with the majority that the
claims are unpatentable. Id. at 1011.
2 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
2 In reBiski, 545 F.3d at 1011 (Rader,J., concurring).Judge Rader, too, ought to
have labeled his opinion a concurrence in the judgment, for he also agrees with the
majority that the claims are unpatentable. Id. at 1013.
2' Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30. Two portions ofJustice Kennedy's opinion-Parts
II-B-2 and II-C-2-represent only a plurality of the Court, given that Justice Scalia did
not joint these portions. See id. at 3223 n.* ("Justice Scalia does not join Parts II-B-2
and II-C-2.").
2011) 5
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Justice Kennedy, like Chief Judge Michel, began his elaboration of
§ 101's terse collection of broad categories by acknowledging that "[t]he
Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101's broad pa-
tent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas."" Although the exceptions are not reflected in § 101's text,
they "have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare
decisis going back 150 years.",o Justice Kennedy then took a bit of a turn,
reframing the machine-or-transformation test from the way of assessing
an idea's abstractness (or not) to an additional extra-textual categorical
exclusion. Admonishing that it "has 'more than once cautioned that
courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions
which the legislature has not expressed,"' 3 1 the Court then concluded
that "[a]dopting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test for
what constitutes a 'process' (as opposed to just an important and useful
clue) violates the[] statutory interpretation principles" that focus on "the
text and the statute's purpose and design."2 The Court thus demoted the
Federal Circuit's criterion from an exclusive test to "a useful and impor-
tant clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101." It also rejected a categorical ex-
clusion against business methods, and for the same reason, i.e., an unwil-
lingness to expand the list of extra-textual exclusions beyond the three
already established (laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas).
Justice Kennedy, having rejected these two additional categorical ex-
clusions, returned to the longstanding categorical exclusion of abstract
ideas and the Court's decisions in Benson and Flook. According to the
Court, Bilski's "claims are not patentable processes because they are at-
tempts to patent abstract ideas.",3 Recapping the facts and analyses in
Benson and Flook, as well as Diehr, Justice Kennedy laid the predicate for a
common-law-style, pattern-matching analysis:
In light of these precedents, it is clear that petitioners' applica-
tion is not a patentable "process." Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' ap-
plication explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk: "Hedging is a fundamental economic practice long
prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introducto-
ry finance class." The concept of hedging, described in claim 1 and
2 Id. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
"0 Id.
" Id. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981)).
2 Id.
* Id. at 3227. Justice Stevens called it "an important test for patentability." Id. at
3235 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer agreed it is "a useful
and important clue" and "an important example of how a court can determine patenta-
bility under § 101." Id. at 3258-59 (Breyer,J., concurring in thejudgment).
' Id. at 3228.
' Id. at 3229-30.
[Vol. 15:16
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reduced to a mathematical formula in claim 4, is an unpatentable
abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and Flook. Al-
lowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this
approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over
an abstract idea.
Petitioners' remaining claims are broad examples of how hedg-
ing can be used in commodities and energy markets. Rook estab-
lished that limiting an abstract idea to one field of use or adding
token postsolution components did not make the concept patenta-
ble. That is exactly what the remaining claims in petitioners' appli-
cation do. These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract
idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct the use
of well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of
the inputs into the equation. Indeed, these claims add even less to
the underlying abstract principle than the invention in Flook did, for
the Rook invention was at least directed to the narrower domain of
signaling dangers in operating a catalytic converter.
The Bilski majority's rationale, albeit more a gesture than an analysis,
marks a strong reaffirmation of Benson and Rook, two cases that many had
thought Diehr largely superseded.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, offered an extensive
historical review of the patentability of business methods. He concluded
that, "although a process is not patent-ineligible simply because it is use-
ful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of
doing business does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101.",38 Indeed, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, "the history of our patent law ... strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that a method of doing business is not a 'process'
under § 101."3 9 His view, however, attracted only three otherJustices.
Finally, Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Scalia, wrote
"to highlight the substantial agreement among many Members of the
Court on many of the fundamental issues of patent law raised by this
Id. at 3231 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (RaderJ., dissenting)).
" See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053,
1057 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Although commentators have differed in their interpreta-
tions of Benson, 17ook, and Diehr, it appears to be generally agreed that these decisions
represent evolving views of the Court, and that the reasoning in Diehr not only elabo-
rated on, but in part superseded, that of Benson and Rook."); Thomas F. Cotter, A
Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 863-64 (2007)
("The first two times the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue of the patentability of
computer-related art, in Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Fook, it appeared to take a
relatively hardline position against the patentability of those inventions.... Four
years [after Flook], however, the Court reversed course in Diamond v. Diehr." (foot-
notes omitted)).
3 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232 (Stevens,J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 3239.
2011] 7
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case. 40 Reflecting a member of the majority and a member of the plurali-
ty, this separate concurrence bridges those other efforts. Justice Breyer
raised "four points [that] are consistent with both the opinion of the
Court andJustice Stevens' opinion,"4 ' as follows:
* "First, although the text of § 101 is broad, it is not without limit."4 2 It
does not extend to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.
* "Second, in a series of cases that extend back over a century, the Court
has stated that '[tiransformation and reduction of an article to a dif-
ferent state or thing is the clue to the patentability of a process claim
that does not include particular machines.'"4
* "Third, while the machine-or-transformation test has always been a
'useful and important clue,' it has never been the 'sole test' for de-
termining patentability."4
* "Fourth, although the machine-or-transformation test is not the only
test for patentability, this by no means indicates that anything which
",45
produces a "'useful, concrete, and tangible result"' is patentable.
Where, then, is the law of patentable subject matter for processes
headed? The PTO has already issued interim guidance to help examiners
hew to the Supreme Court's Bilski decision.6 Meanwhile, the Federal Cir-
cuit undoubtedly has before it many cases, on appeal from both PTO re-
jections and district court invalidity judgments, that permit it to work out
the boundaries of § 101 with the benefit of the Supreme Court's reaffir-
mation of Benson and Flook. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself is responsi-
ble for two such cases, vacating and remanding to the Federal Circuit two
patentable-subject-matter cases-Prometheus and Classen-for further con-
sideration in light of Bilski."
Amid all the opinions across both courts, one vital point emerges
clearly: The Federal Circuit, en banc, has disavowed its Alappat/State Street
misadventure, according to which all a process need do, to pass muster
under § 101, is yield a useful, concrete, and tangible result. 8 The Su-
40 Id. at 3258 (BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment).
41 Id.
4 Id.
4 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)).
4 Id.
4 Id. at 3259 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc.,
149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
46 See Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process
Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg, at 43922 (U.S. Pat. & Trademark Of-
fice July 27, 2010).
1 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010)
(mem.); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)
(mem.).
4 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
(concluding that "the 'useful, concrete and tangible result' inquiry is inadequate").
[Vol. 15:18
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preme Court's comments about State Street in Bilski range from polite-
and, one imagines, slightly embarrassed-indifference 9 to outright hos-
tility.5o In short, the Alappat/State Street standard is dead. The pre-Alappat
cases analyzing process claims under § 101, especially in the period from
just before Benson to just before Alappat, thus take on greater importance
as exemplars of sounder reasoning and results on both sides of the § 101
boundary. I have identified 27 such cases, and the Appendix to this Essay
lists them. These older cases, like Benson and Fook, are new again. They
will reward renewed attention.
On this point, at least, Judge Mayer agreed with the majority, for he was willing to
take a further step: "State Street and AT&Tshould be overruled." Id. at 998 (Mayer,J.,
dissenting).
" Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 ("And nothing in today's opinion should be read as
endorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has used in the past. See, e.g., State Street [and] AT&TCorp."(citations omitted)).
* Id. at 3232 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that "it would
be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a 'useful, concrete and tangible re-
sult' may be patented" (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); id. at 3259 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Indeed, the introduction of the 'useful, concrete, and tangible result'
approach to patentability, associated with the Federal Circuit's State Street decision,
preceded the granting of patents that 'ranged from the somewhat ridiculous to the
truly absurd.' In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting)
(citing patents on, inter alia, a 'method of training janitors to dust and vacuum using
video displays,' a 'system for toilet reservations,' and a 'method of using color-coded
bracelets to designate dating status in order to limit "the embarrassment of rejec-
tion"'). To the extent that the Federal Circuit's decision in this case rejected that ap-
proach, nothing in today's decision should be taken as disapproving of that determi-
nation." (internal citation omitted)).
2011] 9
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APPENDIX
Below is a chronological list of the major CCPA and Federal Circuit
cases, spanning the years 1969 to 1994, adjudicating whether a process
sought to be claimed constitutes patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101. A "+" symbol indicates that the court held the claim(s) in
the case patentable, whereas a "-" symbol indicates that the court held
the claim (s) unpatentable. The symbol "+/-" indicates a mixed result.
+ In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
+ In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
+ In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
+ In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 63
(1972)
- In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
+ In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976)
+ In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
- In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
+ In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)
- In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
+ In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
+ In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
- In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
+ In reJohnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
- In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
+ In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
- In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979)
- In reWalter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
+ In reTaner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
+/- In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
+ In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
- In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
- In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
+ In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
+ Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
- In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
- In reWarmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
10 [Vol. 15:1
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